A year and a half after coming to power, the young "Ze regime" (Zelensky and his Office team, the mono-majority of the "Servant of the People" in parliament) not only lost the reputation of a "national winner", but also lost the moral right to such an important "party of power" characterisation as "national power". The policy of the new "Ze regime" began to be perceived as "dependent", dependent "on external control", "colonial". Those who were supported as the "savior of Ukraine" in 2019 became the embodiment of a new enslavement and dependence in 2020.
It should also be borne in mind that for the overwhelming majority of voters and supporters of Zelensky, the new President in 2019 became the hope for a sustainable peace and the return of Donbass.Zelensky's peacekeeping position, his first steps to restore dialogue with the Russian Federation and members of the Normandy Group, a successful exchange of prisoners, a productive meeting of the Normandy Group in Paris (December 2019) - all of this supported positive expectations. Local elections in Donbass in October 2020 seemed quite real. Zelenskiy's activity and his 2019 peacekeeping initiatives clearly contrasted with the military image and belligerent patriotism of ex-President Poroshenko. The launch of the National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity project (S. Sivokho) looked like the beginning of a large-scale presidential project, which could become the second successful socio-political project, along with the newly-minted Servant of the People party of power.
But the peacekeeping spurt of 2019 was first paused, and by spring the actions and statements of the Ze regime were not much different from the statements of ex-President Poroshenko. In the media, expert-political environment and mass consciousness, Zelensky's indecision and passivity in 2020 was perceived as a "return" to the "war party" (a common stereotype is "a return to Poroshenko's politics"). And even Zelensky's undoubted diplomatic success in ensuring a fairly stable ceasefire (August 2020 - ...) did not rehabilitate the President. Many supporters of peaceful solutions perceived this ceasefire as a "freeze of the conflict." Against the background of pandemic fears and economic downturn, the "frozen" conflict also began to be perceived as a new norm, and the public demand for more decisive action began to fade away.
Intrigues in the TCG and the change of the Ukrainian delegation's head (the departure of L. Kuchma, the arrival of L. Kravchuk) only made the situation worse. In the fall of 2020, two uncoordinated plans for the implementation of the "Minsk agreements" were presented (proposals from the self-proclaimed Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics and the so-called "Kravchuk plan"). But the Ukrainian side was clearly not ready for dialogue and did not agree to a number of advantageous proposals that were contained in an alternative plan (in particular, the readiness of the separatists for the status of "autonomous regions", which corresponds to the provisions of the "Minsk Agreements"). As a result, the negotiation process reached a dead end.
The National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity, which was now backed by several single activists, without the support of the President and his Office, and without active participation of the President's «Servant of the People party» activists, has also found itself in the periphery of events.
In general, Zelenskiy's peacekeeping line was unsuccessful, and he actually lost his reputation as the "president of the peace" (the most important feature of the presidential race winner in 2019, which ensured high mobilization of voters and great trust). In this regard, no "large construction projects" and "electronic services" will replace the failed reconciliation and restoration of unity with Donbass. And this already is both a sociological and obvious fact.