2021
Current situation in Ukraine and predictive domestic political scenarios

First «predicted scenarios», the matrix of which has been used as a basis for this material, were prepared in 2017. More than 3 years have passed. A number of quality characteristics and assessments remained unchanged. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that life brought its adjustments to then proposed scenarios («linear», «reboot», «internal coup», «Ukrainian Novo-Ogarevo process»). The anti-military and anti-corruption protest potential of the society was compensated by the election campaign in 2019. Petro Poroshenko's regime did not dare to take emergency measures. Regional elites have taken advantage of the radical changes in the Centre for the sake of strengthening their own personnel and political positions before the local elections campaign to the self-government bodies.

Social and territorial losses ( the transfer of AR Crimea to the Russian Federation, separatism and «hybrid» war in Donbass) were not a tragic accident or a coincidence of geopolitical circumstances, but are part of the unfolding internal transformations closely related to the crisis of the entire post-Soviet space. The "Second Transformation" (First Transformation - the crisis and collapse of the FSU) is primarily due to the weaknesses of the social system of Ukraine itself, the inefficiency of the predatory corporate state that has developed over the years of independence, the failed modernisation changes in the institutions and in the economy of the country, and as a consequence - the beginning of processes of internal localisation and fragmentation. But in post-Maidan Ukraine, the Second Transformation was understood and perceived by the Ukrainian political and economic elite as a chance for an internal redistribution of power, the state and its assets, spheres of influence, and capital. And it is natural that the post-Maidan government, which was formed in Ukraine in 2014, failed and could not cope with the main task of its time - a new consolidation of society based on strengthening self-government and the general civil peace.

The substitution of self-government by elite-corporate "decentralization", dismantling of the institutions of the social state (reforms in healthcare, education, science and the cultural sphere), strengthening of the power bloc (army, special services, law enforcement agencies and most of the paramilitary formations) and the dominance of a primitive entrepreneurial model of economic development escalated increased the social tension, a new flow of human capital abroad, the level of criminalisation of society, tolerance. the already low level of internal social Ukraine is going through the Second Transformation as through crisis of statehood itself, which threatens with new conflicts and new fragmentation.

Traditionally a lot of expectations are laid on a political force in power in Ukraine (the president and his entourage, the "party of power" in the parliament and government). Perhaps, therefore, as a panacea for the unfolding destructive processes of 2014-2018 the path of broad support for political forces, which were perceived in society as a "new generation" that replaced the «old» was chosen.

The 2019 election campaign (presidential and early parliamentary elections) received a widespread assessment as the "electoral revolution" (and even the "electoral Maidan"). In the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his very young «Servant of the People» party received an unconditional victory with an agenda of peace and frank dialogue with Russia (Donbass, Crimea), justice (wages, tariffs and prices for socially sensitive goods, privileges of " political class ", tolerance in national and linguistic issues), responsible non-corrupt politics (rejection of the privileges of the" political class ", the fight against corruption), moving away from cooperation with the oligarchy. His opponent Petro Poroshenko lost largely because by the time of the elections he was associated by the majority of voters with the "party of war" and with high-profile corruption scandals.

2020 will go down in history as the year of the Global Pandemic (COVID-19). The danger of a deadly disease affects the deepest motives of a person. This is a vital challenge that pushes into the background all other everyday problems and adversities. And in this sense, Ukrainian 2020, as the year of the Catastrophes (pandemic, fires, floods, plane crashes), revealed a rather strong potential for patience and compassion in the Ukrainian society. As in the first year and a half of the war in Donbass (2014-2016), the "deep society" turned out to be stronger and more resilient than the "weak state". The volunteer movement, humanitarian aid of the population, local programs through self-government bodies, business charity - all this shows the ability of the Ukrainian society to survive and act together. But - such social qualities and abilities were perceived in society itself as "action contrary to" the policy of the authorities themselves.

For Ukraine, overcoming the pandemic (COVID-19) has become the very "test of maturity", the failure of which makes the crisis of national power irreversible. (Worth noting that in many countries with a high incidence, the pandemic has become a trigger for political crises).

In turn, the irresponsibility and ineffectiveness of the Ukrainian authorities in the vital issues of combating the pandemic were easily transferred (extrapolated) to other controversial and socially painful issues: land reform, gambling business permission, loan policy (foreign loans, government bonds), restrictions and pressure on small and medium- sized businesses, growth of tariffs for housing and communal services, etc.

A year and a half after coming to power, the young "Ze regime" (Zelensky and his Office team, the mono-majority of the "Servant of the People" in parliament) not only lost the reputation of a "national winner", but also lost the moral right to such an important "party of power" characterisation as "national power". The policy of the new "Ze regime" began to be perceived as "dependent", dependent "on external control", "colonial". Those who were supported as the "savior of Ukraine" in 2019 became the embodiment of a new enslavement and dependence in 2020.

It should also be borne in mind that for the overwhelming majority of voters and supporters of Zelensky, the new President in 2019 became the hope for a sustainable peace and the return of Donbass.Zelensky's peacekeeping position, his first steps to restore dialogue with the Russian Federation and members of the Normandy Group, a successful exchange of prisoners, a productive meeting of the Normandy Group in Paris (December 2019) - all of this supported positive expectations. Local elections in Donbass in October 2020 seemed quite real. Zelenskiy's activity and his 2019 peacekeeping initiatives clearly contrasted with the military image and belligerent patriotism of ex-President Poroshenko. The launch of the National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity project (S. Sivokho) looked like the beginning of a large-scale presidential project, which could become the second successful socio-political project, along with the newly-minted Servant of the People party of power.

But the peacekeeping spurt of 2019 was first paused, and by spring the actions and statements of the Ze regime were not much different from the statements of ex-President Poroshenko. In the media, expert-political environment and mass consciousness, Zelensky's indecision and passivity in 2020 was perceived as a "return" to the "war party" (a common stereotype is "a return to Poroshenko's politics"). And even Zelensky's undoubted diplomatic success in ensuring a fairly stable ceasefire (August 2020 - ...) did not rehabilitate the President. Many supporters of peaceful solutions perceived this ceasefire as a "freeze of the conflict." Against the background of pandemic fears and economic downturn, the "frozen" conflict also began to be perceived as a new norm, and the public demand for more decisive action began to fade away.

Intrigues in the TCG and the change of the Ukrainian delegation's head (the departure of L. Kuchma, the arrival of L. Kravchuk) only made the situation worse. In the fall of 2020, two uncoordinated plans for the implementation of the "Minsk agreements" were presented (proposals from the self-proclaimed Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics and the so-called "Kravchuk plan"). But the Ukrainian side was clearly not ready for dialogue and did not agree to a number of advantageous proposals that were contained in an alternative plan (in particular, the readiness of the separatists for the status of "autonomous regions", which corresponds to the provisions of the "Minsk Agreements"). As a result, the negotiation process reached a dead end.

The National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity, which was now backed by several single activists, without the support of the President and his Office, and without active participation of the President's «Servant of the People party» activists, has also found itself in the periphery of events.

In general, Zelenskiy's peacekeeping line was unsuccessful, and he actually lost his reputation as the "president of the peace" (the most important feature of the presidential race winner in 2019, which ensured high mobilization of voters and great trust). In this regard, no "large construction projects" and "electronic services" will replace the failed reconciliation and restoration of unity with Donbass. And this already is both a sociological and obvious fact.

Unsuccessful anti-pandemic measures in 2020, poor budgeting and the deplorable state of national health care, extremely controversial information policy set in motion all structures of society: certain social strata (doctors, entrepreneurs, pensioners), elite groups (regional elites that opposed the decisions of the central government) , civil and media community, political opposition. In turn, the rise in utility tariffs, job losses, falling incomes and public discontent with the size of quarantine fines have activated more layers of the population. And if by the spring of 2020, positive public expectations were replaced by disappointments, then by the fall of 2020, the growth of civil protest actions began again. The "Vradievsky syndrome" - that is, the readiness for a quick and self- organizing active civil protest - has already become a vivid social phenomenon in the fall of 2020-winter 2021.

Patience and the ability to collectively survive vital challenges, on the one hand, and the "reflexes of revolution", on the other, have created a situation of delicate equilibrium that can last long enough, but at the same time quickly collapse ("crumble") due to a large and a resonant general shock (- the problem of the "common agenda").

In the local elections (October 2020), the regional elites became the main winner. They have strengthened their positions due to the decentralisation policy of 2014-2020. And for the first time after the distant 1994-1998, regional elites acted as independent, albeit scattered players. Not a single political force (party, bloc) of the Center, from the rulling «Servant of the People» party to strong and financially secure opponents of the regime - Eurosolidarity (ex-President P. Poroshenko) and Oposition Platform «For Life»(V. Medvedchuk), coude unite regional elites around themselves, even on a limited scale.

The regions "left" the Center dominance, using the image of «friendly faces». And they are preparing for a big auction, and even for the "capture" of the Center.

By early 2021, «Ze's» regime had become a common anti-hero. Zelensky is now perceived as a traitor to his television prototype - «Goloborodko" (The character of V.Zelensky in the TV series «Servant of the People»). And his disappointed and angry voters need new "heroes." With each new failure of Zelensky, this desire will only intensify.

In the new, vital conditions of fears and catastrophes, the alternative may look like either a new "miracle", a true "folk hero", or else - masculine authority and disciplining force, which brings order and puts everything in its place.

People's Hero or Tyrant. There will be little space for the third.

1. Crisis / disintegration of the social system (localisation and "provincialisation" of life, a high level of labor, business and "educational" migration, ageing of the population, an increase in the proportion of the precariat among the working population).

2. A "weak state" with a crisis political system, with half-destroyed institutions of a "social state" and hypertrophied security institutions and new mechanisms for regulating freedoms (quarantine regimes, the digital platform "Diya", financial and banking control, etc.) ...

3. De-industrialisation and fragmentation of the national economy (falling level of internal division of labor, raw materials orientation, high import dependence, a large share of the "shadow sector" of the economy).

4. New regionalisation, based on the economic and political opportunities created by decentralisation in the context of the collapse of intra-economic ties and economic downturn.

5. Geopolitical and geoeconomic impasse. The transformation of Ukraine into a non-subject territory - a part of a "global province" located outside of large geo-projects.

6. Establishment of prerequisites for further political and economic fragmentation of Ukraine.

Some generalisations. In the context of a pandemic, war and a general decline in living standards, the "precarisation" of the general population (industrial sector, small business, humanitarian sphere) is dynamically unfolding due to the high availability of hired labor and a drop in the level of self-employment, a sharp decrease in the level of income to a critical minimum. There is also a risk of the lumpen proletarians emergence (an impoverished and unemployed part of the urban population who lost their jobs and does not have a permanent income, including the lack of state and local support). The lumpen proletariat can become a new hired "street force" for radical actions in large cities (capital Kiev, regional centers).

A significant part of the more than 12 million pensioners receiving pensions from the Pension Fund (excluding pensioners on the territory of the self-proclaimed LDPR) is on the verge of "pauperisation" ("urban poverty"). At the same time, according to observers, the population in the uncontrolled part of Donbass (especially the socially unprotected layers) faces a real humanitarian catastrophe (income, living conditions, food, medical assistance, etc.)

The 2020-21 quarantine measures have collapsed the already low level of interregional communications (civil, business, cultural and humanitarian), which is especially noticeable in the East of Ukraine (areas bordering the territory of hostilities and places of deployment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Donbas).

A decrease in the level of internal communications and restrictions on movement in the East of Ukraine stimulate "localisation" of life and orientation of people towards local opportunities and methods of survival, increase the dependence and loyalty of residents to local elites (authorities of the United Territorial Communities, district, city and region). This played an important role in electoral behaviour and motivation for voters to vote in the 2020 local elections.

Protest activity, which during 2020 was restrained by the risks of a pandemic and the depressive state of society as a whole, began to grow again by the end of 2020 and early 2021. It is also important to take into account that the growth of protest sentiments and actions (so far) of a local nature finds support among the new local authorities (based on the results of the 2020 local elections), where local elites and local political investors play a key role. Protest potential can be dramatically increased in the event of major infrastructural shocks (gas and energy supply), resonant elite scandals (new facts of corruption), high-profile political events of a tragic nature (resonant political crimes against civil rights).

The weakness of the humanitarian "proletarised" class and the lack of moral authority reinforce the radical populist sentiments of the active part of the protesting citizens. A rapid rise in the influence of local and national radical populist forces is quite likely.

Additional comment. The past models (2010-2019) of the power monopoly on the information agenda through control over the leading media (TV, influential Internet publications, news has been replaced by mediacracy as an established political and economic force

that uses media resources as a tool in the struggle for power. Firstly, communication networks and "network channels" (Telegram channel, etc.) have pushed aside traditional Internet resources; editorial policies have been replaced by anonymous information policy of influence, interpretations and speculations. Secondly, TV channels have become an integral part of party-corporate politics and a way of "growing" TV politicians - a new phenomenon in Ukrainian politics. Thirdly, the information and political agenda has completely subordinated the social (everyday), economic and cultural agenda. The overwhelming majority of information media resources assign non-political topics a secondary, or even a tertiary role.

The propaganda and kitsch products of the "information war", as well as the systematic isolation of the national information space, create the effect of a closed "steam boiler": the susceptibility of mass consciousness to sensational facts, the expectation of the "truth." The low cultural level of the environment makes it easy to manipulate mass sentiments (for example, information manipulation with the topic of a pandemic).

The politicisation of self-government that took place during the last election campaign (2020) significantly capitalises the media resources of the regional and interregional levels. The "media matryoshka effect" is quite likely, when the information and propaganda policy at the national level and the political struggle waged there will be transferred to regional platforms, with the participation of regional elites and their media resources. The new information-political and semantic "media-map" in the next year or two may become another catalyst for deeper regionalisation and fragmentation of the entire national media space.

The very sphere of politics, in which mediacracy and media management are playing an increasing role, is being de-intellectualised (in essence, the elite is experiencing an "intellectual default"). The gap between knowledge, control technologies and real social interests is reaching a critically dangerous limit. It is no coincidence that the political myth about "external management" as a manifestation of dependence and incompetence has become one of the most perceived and widespread political myths in Ukraine over the past two years (2019-2020).

The crisis of domestic science and its institutions, judging by what has been happening in recent years, is becoming irreversible. Evidence of this is the "ageing" of the academic world, lack of continuity, deplorable material and personnel position of the overwhelming majority of academic structures, a decline in the level of education in leading university centres, and a large outflow of young students abroad ("educational migration").

In fact, Ukraine is turning into a consumer country of external education and external knowledge, which, along with technological and financial dependence, threatens a rapid decrease in the quality of human capital and an increase in the export of educated labor abroad for "further education" and redistribution to other economies.

Additional comment. The inefficiency and crisis of the political system became the main reason for the further degradation of Ukrainian statehood. Imbalances in the relationship between the presidency, the judiciary, legislative and executive branches, and the growing ambitions of local self-government create the basis for the next, third in a row in the last decade, rebellious and protest situation.

Ukrainian politics became smaller and more fragmented than before. None of the parliamentary forces can cope with the role of the national one.

We will also feel the deficit of politicians-leaders on a national scale.

The influence and authority of regional leaders (level - regional and city councils, city halls of large cities) have increased.

In this situation, the power of only one ruling group can be ensured either by establishing a temporary personal dictatorship (which is unlikely), or by collusion of the ruling elites, where the price for stability and loyalty will be primarily the actual strengthening of the powers and independence of the ruling regional groups.

"Federalisation without a federal treaty" is one of the scenarios for a compromise between the elites in the event of a further deepening of the political crisis in 2021.

Additional comment. The "smoldering" conflict strengthens the separation of Ukraine from Donbass, motivates the warring parties to the final political, social and economic "divorce".

At the same time, the security and defense-related Ukrainian Armed Forces and the National Guard, intelligence officers, as well as former combatants are turning into a self-sufficient and politicised social force that makes up an essential part of the social base of power. Patriotic sentiment and the position of the "military workforce" are two important characteristics of this force. The loyalty of a military army of many thousands (mobilised, contract soldiers, volunteers) is associated with the stability of their financial situation (funding the army and maintaining the mobilisation regime) and the preservation of the national-statist agenda of state policy. Potentially, this social force forms the basis for further strengthening of the so-called "Parties of war", or it can become the basis for radical opposition in the event of radical shifts in the negotiation and peacekeeping process.

In Donbass, the "smoldering conflict" and the economic blockade can lead to internal shocks and changes in the composition of the current "military regimes" of the self-proclaimed LDPR. But autonomist (separatist) sentiments will be stable, regardless of the change in the composition, which is associated with the "trauma of war" and the rejection of the national-statist ideology of the Ukrainian authorities.

Additional comment:

Failure to fulfil the obligations of the parties according to the latest agreements at the meeting of the Normandy Group (December 2019) and the selfishness of the new Ukrainian government created additional reputation risks for the leadership of France and Germany.

The geopolitical conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which turned into the inclusion of Crimea into the Russian Federation and into an armed conflict ("hybrid war") in Donbass, dramatically changed the security regime in the EU, and created a threat of destruction of the European order (borders, deployment of armed forces, aggravation in "points of tension "Along the eastern European border of the EU)

At the same time, Ukraine's unwillingness to compromise and to establish a bilateral dialogue with the Russian Federation, the losses of the European economy from sanctions against the Russian Federation create the basis for the pragmatization of the policy of the EU leaders (implementation of gas transportation projects, cooperation to overcome the coronavirus pandemic, possible cooperation on the European "hydrogen strategy", and - which is very painful for Ukraine - the revision of the sanctions regime).

It is possible that by 2022, after overcoming the pandemic and European election campaigns, the position of the EU and its leaders will be significantly toughened. In particular, on the issue of Crimea - "freezing" the situation; on the Donbass issue - coercion into an internal dialogue on the reorganisation of Ukraine (autonomous regions or even federalisation) and to a bilateral negotiation process between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This, in turn, will increase the tension between the EU, the US and the UK, weaken the authority and importance of the emerging "Crimean Platform".

Any attempts by the Ukrainian authorities to strengthen their positions by escalating the conflict will be blocked by all possible means.

The option of a "new border" is also unacceptable, which will be viewed as an attempt to revise the entire European order. This means that the scenario of "freezing the conflict", even if possible, will be executed as temporary and transitional, with clearly defined conditions and terms.

The situation may be critical and so far unpredictable if the Ukrainian side continues the economic blockade and postpones the new negotiation process on the "Minsk agreements", and the Russian Federation, in turn, increases the amount of aid to the self-proclaimed republics and agrees to (partial) recognition of LDPR as their legitimate partners.

The new US administration (J. Biden, Democrats) will actively promote the policy of "pressure on Russia", the consolidation of BritAmerica and the EU in the «containment of Russia» issues: strengthening Euro-Atlantic cooperation, strengthening the "buffer" Central European and South Asian "belts". But there is a high probability of a significant divergence in the strategies of the EU and BritAmerica on these issues.

Additional comment: The economic crisis in Ukraine has a pronounced geoeconomic and structural nature. First of all, those economic complexes that were linked to the division of labor with the post-Soviet space (RF, EEC countries, etc.) are subject to destruction and / or transformation.

Radical changes are taking place in the mining and metallurgical complex, the chemical industry, the military-industrial complex, transport: breaking ties, losing or changing markets, stopping enterprises, forming new local ties. As a result, the positions of the leading financial and industrial groups (the "old oligarchy"), which actually or potentially competed with the ruling forces, were undermined.

The dominant in the power of commercial, financial and agro-industrial capital groups significantly affects economic policy: the economic model is radically re-profiled (agrarian-raw material orientation), the social situation changes abruptly (unemployment and impoverishment of the population - as a result of de-industrialisation and a general drop in income) High dependence on external financing and the beginning of "domino effect" in industry (disruptions in the fuel and energy complex, a drop in production in civil engineering) create a situation of permanent instability, direct dependence on the situation on the global agricultural market, vulnerability of the national currency, deflationary overproduction due to the fall of the purchasing power of the population.

Localisation of economies within agro-regions stimulates the economic selfishness of local elites. The struggle for additional income is gradually shifting to the competition for local natural resources (land resources and the participation of regional authorities in natural rent), which will become the basis for economic separatism of the regions. The risk of new crises (non-payments, rising prices, energy supplies) will only strengthen the local autonomist sentiments, further bringing together the interests of the population and regional elites.

The beginning of the land market functioning and the associated socio-economic consequences can only intensify the economic separatism and selfishness of local self-government, which, most likely, will act from the standpoint of protecting the interests of shareholders and local tenants. Thus, land reform can become catalysts for a new regional pragmatism and economic separatism, intensify the split and conflict between the Center and the regions, and strengthen the intra-regional verticals of the elites (UTC-district-region).

The stated characteristics and assessments indicate the inertia of the processes, the "inertia of attenuation" of development, and the prerequisites for a new fragmentation of the country.

Four hypothetical internal political scenarios are proposed, with varying degrees of probability.

Scenario 1.

"Stagnation and corporate reboot"

In essence, we are talking about an inertial scenario, taking into account the already accumulated problems and conflicts among the political elites. The social aggravation of the situation associated with the economic consequences of "lockdowns" due to COVID-19 pandemic and the growth of tariffs in housing and communal services is compensated by minor concessions on the part of authorities. Rebooting the composition of the government ("corporate coalition"), which will include representatives of all major political investors.

The peace process in Donbas will be frozen, the ceasefire will be maintained.

The key topics of summer 2021 - the land market and the "Crimean Platform" in foreign policy - can sharply raise the degree of social and political tension. There is a real risk of a new deterioration in relations with the Russian Federation, up to mutual sanctions (as a consequence of the decisions and statements of the "Crimean Platform").

Consolidation of the population, business and regional elites around the "protection of the land."

The critical period is the second half of summer and early autumn (large external payments, problems with the state budget). The growth of political protests, pushing the President to decide on early parliamentary elections (the radical option is the 4th quarter of 2021, the best option is the first quarter of 2022).

Elections to parliament on a party basis (closed party lists), which stimulates temporary coalitions of regional elites with "oligarchic" parties.

New oligarchic coalition with the President in the spring of 2022, with guarantees of his power until 2024.

The scenario solves the problems of self-defence of big political business (the main oligarchic groups), in fact it means "farewell to Donbass".

Circumstances. The weakness of the «Servant of the People party» is already pushing Zelenskiy to play "over the party." The option of a full term in exchange for corporate compromises may be considered quite acceptable.

External players, the United States and Great Britain, can use this scenario to ensure maximum loyalty of the political and economic elites (legalisation of capital, guarantees against sanctions) and use the unresolved problems of Donbass within the framework of the policy of the Russian Federation and the European Union's disengagement.

The European Union will take a neutral position, freezing or even abandoning the Normandy format as ineffective, building its interests with the Russian Federation and its allies "above" the Ukrainian problem.

The script fits well into the framework of the so-called "Little Ukraine",

The probability is above average.

Scenario 2.

"Authoritarian transition"

The social aggravation of the situation associated with the economic consequences of "lockdowns" due to COVID-19 pandemic and the growth of tariffs in housing and communal services is compensated by minor concessions on the part of authorities. But rebooting the composition of the government will be radical and will be presented as the establishment of a "strong anti-crisis government."

Involvement of a significant figure-leader for the post of prime minister, reshuffle in the power bloc (Security Service of Ukraine , Ministry of Internal Affairs, anti-corruption bodies), a new "cleanup" of the heads of regional administrations. The policy of "tightening the screws" in relation to the largest political opponents {business, media, compromising evidence).

The coalition is being reset in parliament. One or two new factions join the 'Servant of the People' party as coalitions, and a new anti-crisis ( catastrophic) coalition plan is adopted.

The peace process in Donbass can be continued as a new round of discussion of "plans for the implementation of the Minsk agreements." Change in the composition of the Ukrainian delegation to the TCG. Possible shifts in Ukrainian-Russian relations {up to negotiations). A plan for a "transition period" until 2024 {the year of parliamentary elections) is possible.

The land issue is procedurally frozen ( example, by complicating the procedures and rules for buying and selling land), a compromise is reached with the regional elites.

The «Crimean Platform» is limited to an expert-diplomatic forum.

The topic of early elections is removed from the agenda. A possible alternative is the preparation of a deep reform of the political system {perhaps broader - constitutional reform) with a focus on elections-2024 (parliament, president).

Circumstances. Zelenskiy will have to accept the fact of "two leaders", one of whom will play the role of a power ruler. Most of the oligarchic

groups will go into the opposition. Ukraine will find itself in the conditions of a tough informational and ideological war and even repression.

In this scenario, the EU will behave more interested than the US and UK. Much will depend on the position and policy of the Russian Federation.

The probability is medium.

Scenario 3.

"Federalization without federalism"

The social aggravation of the situation associated with the economic consequences of "lockdowns" due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the growth of tariffs in housing and communal services is compensated by minor concessions on the part of the authorities. Restarting the composition of the government and attracting new "technical figures" will buy time until the summer of 2021. The peace process in Donbass will most likely be frozen and the ceasefire will be maintained.

The key themes of summer 2021 - the land market and the "Crimean Platform" in foreign policy - can abruptly raise the degree of social and political tension. There is a real risk of a new deterioration in relations with the Russian Federation, up to mutual sanctions (as a consequence of the decisions and statements of the "Crimean Platform").

Consolidation of the population, business and regional elites around the "protection of the land."

The critical period is the second half of summer and early autumn (large external payments, problems with the state budget). The growth of political protests. Blocking the authorities. Promotion of the initiative on accelerated reform of the political system with the obligatory creation of the upper chamber of parliament - the chamber of regions, and the development of the institution of regional economic autonomy ( broad and active support of local elites). A referendum and early parliamentary elections are possible (There is a high probability that "soft federalism" will take shape with the development of the institution of autonomy. The Russian Federation gets the opportunity to increase its influence on the elites of the southeastern and southern regions. A new round of negotiations on Donbass, borders and Ukrainian-Russian relations will be possible no earlier than 2023/2024. In the future composition of the central Ukrainian government, new groups of influence will emerge, "grown" from the composition of regional elites.

Circumstances. After the 2020 elections, regional elites were given the opportunity to open political "fronting" with the Center, relying on the new political and party structure of local councils. Most of the deputies from other parties in the near future will be dragged / re-bought into their own associations and blocs. In the event that a new "corporate deal" does not take place in the center and the changes are limited only to technical rearrangements, the regional elites will be able to increase the pressure. Most likely, all major Western partners (USA, UK, EU) will take a neutral position in this situation, limiting themselves only to the framework of preventing disintegration and new separatism. The countries "along the perimeter" will behave more actively, striving to increase their influence on the regions of their priority interests (Romania, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, Turkey).

The script fits into the framework of the so-called "Little Ukraine",

The probability is below average.

Scenario 4.

" Fragmentation "

The social aggravation of the situation associated with the economic consequences of "lockdowns" due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the growth of tariffs in housing and communal services is compensated by minor concessions on the part of the authorities.

Restarting the composition of the government will be limited to "technical figures" and will buy time until the summer of 2021. The peace process in Donbas will be frozen, the ceasefire will be maintained.

The oligarchic political opposition, dissatisfied with the changes in power, will stake on "rocking the boat." Scenarios of destabilisation in the currency exchange and food markets are not excluded.

The next peak of exacerbation is the summer of 2021 ( opening of the land market). Further destabilisation of the situation in the country is possible, in which the regional elites will stake on political and electoral consolidation in their regions.

The economic situation in the country, given the volume of external payments in 2021 (especially in the third quarter), may in such conditions get out of the control of the government.

The risk of new Maidans is real in the fall of 2021, with the participation of motivated, organised and armed national-patriotic forces. If the Maidan is inspired, the probability of the collapse of the "Zelensky regime" is high. The situation will become chaotic.

Large opposition forces ("Eurosolidarity" by P. Poroshenko and Opposition Platform «For Life» of V. Medvedchuk) will be focused on their basic regions - West / Center and East / South of Ukraine. A new confrontation can turn into an wave of self-proclamation of autonomies, holding interregional congresses ("Severodonetsk syndrome"), failure to comply with the decisions of the Center, etc.

The threat of a new disintegration of Ukraine will become real.

Circumstances. Considering that this is the "shortest" scenario, it is extremely difficult to predict its likely outcome. Especially if in the fall of 2021 in Kiev and in regional centres mass riots with the participation of paramilitary organisations will begin. This scenario has no external allies, since the risks of crisis and disintegration are higher than any rational calculation.

Probability is unlikely.