- new deindustrialization. More than 200 industrial enterprises were physically destroyed, equipment was destroyed, and in most cases, the infrastructure of enterprises is destroyed too;
- de-urbanization. Cities and small towns, housing infrastructure, transport communications, and water supply are being destroyed. Given the loss of economic assets, cities and small towns are at risk of losing the economic basis of recovery (enterprises and communications);
- social decapitalization. Spontaneous resettlement to the central and western regions of Ukraine, as well as the migration of Ukrainians abroad, can lead to a significant change in the professional and demographic composition of the affected territories, especially in the once industrial areas of large cities and mono-cities. There is a risk of losing the social capital of entire sectors of the economy and social structures (the system of raising and educating children, the healthcare sector, service, scientific and engineering activities, etc.);
- destruction of industrial and cooperative business ties, which is especially painful for large industrial and agro-industrial groups (loss of tangible assets, disruption of supply chains, blocking of exports, etc.);
- termination or sharp reduction in production volumes of large, small and medium-sized businesses in the affected territories and territories of increased risk of military operations (industrial production, domestic market, transport, services). This has already led to a collapse in revenues to the state and local budgets, an increase in unemployment.
But the economy lives even in conditions of catastrophes. The problem is that as hazards and risks increase, economic activity simplifies to the level of providing for people's priority needs - food, movement and transportation, basic utilities, communications. The exchange system is also being simplified: the economy is "going into the shadows", trying to minimize losses in the face of war risks and low purchasing power of consumers (up to barter and natural exchange).
And if the government solves critical problems that pose a direct threat to security and stability in an operational "manual" mode" (repair of critical infrastructure damaged by hostilities, solving critical shortages - for example, fuel etc.), then the rest of the problems have so far been left to chance.
Complex activities that require equipment, logistics, complex professions, components and market infrastructure objectively appear to be "on the sidelines".
So called "centers of power" gaining key importance. They regulate and control economic activity. Among them are (1) the state (administrative vertical, under martial law - military-administrative), (2) local self-government, and (3) "shadow sector", "informal economies" (Crime, centers of local economic power - "agro-barons", owners of retail networks and gas stations, owners of enterprises and infrastructure). The main functions of these "centers of power" are the regulation of relations, security, credit and "power" support. Due to the weakness of the state apparatus and the actual "neutralization" of self-government (with the exception of city mayors as natural "centers" on-site), shadow circles and influential local businesses came to the fore.